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Underlying most arguments against the free market is a lack
of belief in freedom itself. l

I

Introduction
On May 7, 2002, three physicians filed a class action lawsuit

.. B.A. with Honors, The Johns Hopkins University 1998; .J.D., cum laude, Georgetown University Law Center 2004; M.D., with Recognition in Humanities, State University of New York at Stonybrook candidate 2005. I would like to thank my parents and
siblings for their constant and unending love and support. I also would like to thank
Anna for putting up with me and being there for me whenever I needed her. A special
thanks goes out to Professor Salop and Dean Williams for their helpful guidance and
comments in preparing this Article. I am indebted to my friends in the AMA who
argued with me on many occasions, and whose arguments to the cuntrary made this
Article stronger. Finally, a special thanks goes out to my good friend Mike Heinz for
taking the time out of his very busy schedule to help check the spelling and grammar in
what otherwise would have been a much less comprehensible work.
I MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (1962).

59

60

QUINNIPIAC HEALTH LAW

[Vol. 8:59

that shook American organized medicine to the core. 2 The
plaintiffs attacked a veritable institution that has been in place
for over fifty years and which almost every single U.S. medical
school graduate during this time has used to obtain placement
in a graduate medical training program, or a residency. The
subject of the lawsuit's attack was the National Resident Matching Program ("NRMP"), also known as the "Match." The plaintiffs claimed that the NRMP together with accrediting
organizations form a giant conspiracy designed to depress wages
of individuals employed by residencies. 3 The plaintiffs alleged
that the fact that an average salary of a resident hovers around
$40,000, irrespective of the region or specialty, indirectly proves
the agreement to stabilize wages. 4 The plaintiffs asked for treble
damages, but most importantly, for an injunction against the future operation of the Match. s
The named defendants were sufficiently alarmed by the litigation and sought a legislative answer. On April 10, 2004, nearly
two years after the litigation commenced, the President signed
into law the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004,6 which provided the NRMP and the institutions participating in the Match
with a blanket antitrust exemption except as to direct price fixing. 7 In this Act, Congress made findings that the Match is a
"highly efficient, pro-competitive" process. s The District Court,
relying on this statute, subsequently dismissed the suit.9
This article focuses on the NRMP system and argues that
the process is neither efficient nor pro-competitive. This article
argues that Congress erred in bestowing an antitrust exemption
on the NRMP and the participating institutions.
This article suggests that although the system may have
been necessary to check the problem of early recruiting that was
2

Jung v. AAMC, No. CIVA02-0873 PLF, 2004 \\'1. 1803198 (D.D.C. Aug. 12,

2004).
3 Jung v. AAMC, Plaintifft' Class Action Complaint at 5-6, available at http://www.
savethematch.org/pdf/complaint.pdf (last visited Sept. 13,2004) [hereinafter Plaintiffs
Class Action complaint].
4 Id. at 30-3l.
sId. at 33-34.
6 Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-218, 118 Stat. 596 (2004)
[hereinafter Pension Funding Equity Act].
7 Id. § 207(b)(2)-(3).
8 Id. § 207(a)(1) (E).
9 See supra note 2, at 29.
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pervasive in the 1950s (similar to the one that plagued the federaljudiciary until just two years ago), the system has oudived its
usefulness. Part II will explain the Match's history and function
and will discuss how the system makes participation in the Match
inevitable and required. Part III will focus on the economic
analysis of the system. It will argue that the Match abolishes the
students' ability to bargain by preventing students from receiving
several offers of employment. This section will explain that although the student participating in the Match may receive his
most preferred choice, his lack of ability to negotiate salary and
benefits precludes him from making a proper judgment as to
which choice he truly most prefers. Part III will also analyze the
procompetitive justifications put forth by the Match proponents
and will conclude that these stated benefits are ephemeral.
Part IV will focus on the analysis of relevant case law. The
caselaw is useful to this analysis, even though it is moot in light of
the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, as it suggests that the
NRMP's conduct has been viewed as anticompetitive for quite
some time, notwithstanding congressional findings. In the next
part, the article examines several alternatives to the NRMP and
concludes that a free market system, limited only by defined
dates of entry and exit from the market, is the appropriate mechanism by which medical students should select their residencies.
This part argues that other systems, such as allowing students to
match into multiple places only alleviate, but do not solve, the
problem raised by Part III. Further, Part V argues that any system other than the free market will wreak havoc on the residency programs by potentially causing them to over- or underenroll residents. The article's conclusion is in Part VI.

II.

History and Operation of the NRMP

A graduate of a United States medical school obtains his
Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) degree upon completion of the requisite curriculum of study at that school. 10 The M.D. degree in
10 See, e.g., STATE UNlV. OF N.Y. AT STONY BROOK, SCH. OF l\1ED., Policies & Procedures
Manual, available at http://www.hsc.stonybrook.edu/som/policy2/index.cfm (last visited May 4, 2004) (listing degree requirements including four years of study and passage of USMLE Steps 1 & 2 (licensing exams»; STANFORD UNIY., SCH. OF Mm.,
Requirements for Graduatian, available at http://med.stanford.edu/md/curriculum/requirements.html (last visited May 4, 2004) (same); BAYLOR COLL. OF Mm., Requirements
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and of itself, however, does not permit its holder to practice the
art of medicine. In all fifty states and the District of Columbia,
the holder of the M.D. degree is required to pass several licensing exams and complete from one to three years of post-graduate medical studies. 11 These studies are commonly known as an
internship or a residency. During the course of these post-graduate studies a physician acquires his specialty.

A.

The History of the Match

Internships were introduced to American medical education at the turn of the 20th century.12 Internships provided an
opportunity for interns to finally train in clinical medicine after
four years of theoretical practice and observation. Hospitals benefited from the cheap labor provided by the interns. 13 Both
then and now, the number of residency positions exceeded the
number of U.S. graduates applying for such positions. 14
Because the supply of positions originally exceeded demand
for them, hospitals utilized several mechanisms to secure top
ranked students. IS One of the means used by hospitals to recruit
the most desirable applicants was to make offers to these students earlier than other hospitals.1 6 Such ploys quickly resulted
in the forward creep of the appointment date. 17 The situation
quickly became quite absurd. Students started receiving offers
during their second year of medical studies,18 long before they
had seen a patient or worked in any clinical department. 19 AJfor the Degree Doctor of Medicine, available at Imp:! /www.bcm.edu/osa/handbook/doctor_degree.html (last visited May 4,2004) (same).
II See, e.g., CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, §§ 1315,1321,1328 (2004); 22 TEX. ADMIN.
CODE § 163.2 (2004); N.V. CaMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 60.1 (2004).
12 See Alvin Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A
Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991, 992 (1984).
13Id.
14 At the present time, however, the overall number of applicants exceeds the
number of positions. This is so because there is a large number of foreign trained
physicians who are also vying for residencies. See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM,
Advanced Data Tables for 2004 Residency Match at 2-3, available at http://www.nrmp.org/
2004advdata.pdf (last visited May 5, 2004) (stating that in 2004 there were a total of
21,192 first-year positions offered through the Match and 25,246 active applicants of
whom only 14,609 were U.S. medical students) (hereinafter "NRMP, Data Tables").
15 Roth, supra note 12, at 992-93.
16 Id. at 993.
17 Id. at 993-94.
18 Id. at 994.
19 The medical school curriculum is subdivided into clinical and pre-clinical years.
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though all the institutional participants in post-graduate medical
education recognized the problem, none were able or willing to
stop the forward creep.20 The offers extended by these hospitals
were often good for just a few hours.21 As a result, students had
to decide very quickly, prior to even deciding on their field of
practice, whether or not to accept a given hospital'S offer. Although, given the surplus of positions, a student could be assured of finding one at virtually any time, the highly coveted
positions did not remain available for long, resulting in pressure
to accept the first offer that the student received. 22
Eventually, the hospitals realized that the early appointment
date was impractical for both them and the students, and consequently, they set out to find a solution. In 1945, medical schools
agreed to embargo all of the academic information about students until the end of the third year of studies. 23 Schools abided
by this agreement and the problem of early appointments was
largely resolved. 24 However, the students were still faced with
the problem of "exploding" offers, i.e., offers that were good
only for a limited time. 25 A student who was accepted into a
second or third choice hospital, but was waitlisted by a more preferred program essentially had to gamble. 26 He could either
take the less preferred position and forego the chance to do residency in a more desired location or give up the less desired position in hopes to be taken off the waitlist in the hospital that he
most preferred. Of course, a student could accept a less preferred position and then break the commitment, but such behavior was considered unprofessional, and therefore, not truly
an option. 27
Hospitals attempted to find several mechanisms to deal with
the "optimization" problem described above. First, hospitals
agreed that an offer to a student would remain open for ten
The first two years involve pre-clinical classroom instruction in subjects like Biochemistry, Anatomy, Pharmacology, etc. The last two years involve students spending several
weeks in various hospital departments (e.g., Surgery, Internal Medicine, Obstetrics, etc).
20 Roth, supra note 12, at 993-94.
21 ld. at 994-95.
22 See id. at 994.
23 ld.
241d.
25 Roth, supra note 12, at 994.
26 ld.
27 See id.
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days.28 This would enable a student to contact more desired programs in an attempt to secure an offer from them without the
fear of losing the offer already made. Eventually, however, the
hospitals attempted to shorten the period during which the offer
was left open. By 1949, a twelve hour period was rejected as too
long. 29 The appointment day began at 12:01 A.M., and the hospitals could demand answers within minutes. 3o A centralized
matching system was implemented in order to avoid this midnight madness. Hospitals and students would still make individual contacts (e.g., applications, interviews); however, hospitals
would submit a list of their preferred candidates and applicants
would submit a list of their preferred hospitals to the centralized
agency.3] This centralized agency would then "match" students
and hospitals. This was the birth of the National Resident
Matching Program.

B.

The Operations of the NRJ'vlP

Over eighty percent of all first year residencies are offered
through the NRMP. 32 A vast majority of graduating U.S. medical
students sign up with the program. 33 The participation of either
hospitals or students, however, is not completely voluntary. Hospitals are strongly encouraged to participate in the Match by the
residency accrediting body, the Accreditation Commission on
Graduate Medical Education ("ACGME").34 Many medical
schools require their students to sign contracts with the NRMP.35
Id. at 994-95.
Id. at 995.
30 Roth, supra note 12, at 995.
31 Id.
32 Plaintiffs' Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at 23.
33 Melinda Creasman, Resuscitating the National Resident Matching Program: Improving
Medical Resident Placement through Binding Dual Matching, 56 VAND. 1. REv. 1439, 1444
(2003).
34 See ACGME, Institutional Requirements I1I.A.2.b., available at http://www.acgme.
org (last visited May 5, 2004) ("In selecting from among qualified applicants, it is
strongly suggested that the Sponsoring Institution and all of its ACGME-accredited programs
participate in an organized matching program, such as the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP), where such is available" (emphasis added».
A hospital effectively cannot run a residency program without the ACGME accreditation. Without such accreditation, a hospital cannot receive federal moneys for resident training, nor can the graduates of unaccredited programs qualifY for licensure in
any U.S. state.
35 See, e.g., STATE UNIV. OF NY. AT STONY BROOK, SCH. OF MEn., The Internship Quest,
available at http://www.uhmc.sunysb.edu/som/academics/FourthYear/intemsh.html
28
29
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Even if the medical school imposes no such requirement, students who do not sign with the NRMP risk being unable to interview for employment in any residency program.
In the summer of the fourth year of medical school, students begin applying to various residency programs. 36 As mentioned previously, the vast majority of these programs participate
in the NRMP. 37 The NRMP contract bars the participating programs from offering any available slots outside the Match process. 38 Thus, a student who chooses to forgo the Match also
automatically forgoes any opportunity to obtain a spot in a participating program. Once a student chooses to participate in the
Match, he signs an agreement with the NRMP whereby he agrees
(1) to not seek positions outside of the Match process 39 and (2)
to abide by the results of the Match process. 40
At about the same time that the student signs an agreement
with the NRMP, he submits applications to various hospitals. 41
These hospitals, in turn, decide whether to interview the student. Mter the interviews are completed, the student submits a
preference-ordered list (a "rank order list" or "ROL") of hospitals to the NRMp42 and the hospitals submit an ROL of students
that they interviewed. 43 Beginning in approximately mid-February and lasting through mid-March, the NRMP utilizes a compli(last visited May 4,2004) ("All students who expect to graduate must enter the Match."
(emphasis added).
36 See id. at Table I, available at http://www.uhmc.sunysb.edu/som/academics/
FourthYear/timeline.html (last visited May 5,2004) (specifying that applications to programs are to be sent between July and August of the senior year).
37 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
38 NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, Match Participation Agreement for Applicants
and Programs § 6.0, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_main.
html#match_commit (last visited May 5, 2004) ("It is a material breach of this Agreement for a participant in the Matching Program to make any verbal or written contract
for appointment to a concurrent year residency position prior to the Matching Program") [hereinafter NRMP, Agreement for Applicants & Programs].
39 [d.
40 [d. § 5.1. ("The listing of an applicant by a program on its certified rank order
list or of a program by an applicant on the applicant's certified rank order list establishes a binding commitment to offer or to accept an appointment if a match results
.... Failure to honor this commitment by either party participating in a match will be a
material breach of this Agreement and may result in penalties .... ")
41 See Save the Match: How the Match Works http://www.savethematch.org/history/
howworks.aspx# (last visited May 5, 2004) ("Applicants must apply directly to programs
in addition to registering for the NRMP's matching service.") [hereinafter How the
Match Works].
42 See id.
43 See id.
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cated algorithm to match students' and hospitals' preferences. 44
Students who do not match receive notice two to three days earlier than the general release of the Match results, along with a
list of unmatched hospitals spots. 45 These students can then directly call these institutions to obtain a position in a process aptly
named "the Scramble." Only students who have participated in
the Match are allowed access to the list of unmatched hospital
programs during the period preceding notice of the match results. 46 Thus, studen ts who choose to forgo the Match cannot
Scramble until the complete Match results are released. 47 Finally, in mid- to late-March, students receive the results of the
Match on a day known as the "Match Day," and are bound to
accept that result. 48 On that day, the non-participating students
also can attempt to secure whatever spots remain unfilled.
In order to prevent violations of the agreement (both preand post-Match Day), the NRMP threatens and does punish violators. Students who are found to violate the Match agreement
are reported to their medical school deans, to the American
Board of Medical Specialties,49 and to the directors of the programs that have hired the applicant. 50 Upon learning of the
Match violation, a medical school dean presumably can apply
disciplinary measures to the student and the program director
may dismiss an applicant from the program. 51 Furthermore, the
See id.
See id.
4fi See http://www.savethematch.org/history/howworks.aspx# (last visited May 5,
2004). ("Access to these lists is restricted to Match participants.")
47 Id.
48 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
49 The ABMS is an umbrella organization of various specialty Boards. Specialty
Boards are responsible for administering exams to verifY physicians' competence in a
given specialty. Upon passing these exams a physician can become Board certified.
Although Board certification has no impact on licensure, it has a direct impact on the
potential earnings. Thus, if ABMS chooses to usc the Match violation as a bar to obtaining Board certification, such an action can dramatically affect the future financial
fortunes of the violator.
50 This, of course, is relevant only if the director of the program did not know of
the applicant's status as a violator. This could occur if an applicant matches to program
A, but forgoes that offer, and obtains employment with program B, while not telling
that program that he has matched somewhere else. See NRMP, Agreementfor Applicants
& Programs, supra note 38, § 7.2.1.
51 Although the NRMP Agreement is not specific on what other consequences can
befall a student, it does state that aggrieved participants can resort to other remedies
beyond the penalties imposed by the NRMP. See NRMP, Agreement for Applicants & Programs § 7.3. Furthermore, it would be quite pointless to notifY the Dean of the medical
44
45
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NRMP reserves the right to ban student violators from the Match
process for up to three years. 52 Given the fact that participation
in the Match is almost obligatory if one is serious about securing
a residency, a bar on the participation can potentially bar an individual from becoming a licensed physician for up to three
years.
The penalties against hospitals that violate the Match agreement are slightly less severe. The violator residency program
may be identified as such on the NRMP website for up to three
years post-violation.5~ Presumably, this identification would discourage students from ranking the program highly. Violations
discovered prior to the Match day may result in the NRMP removing the residency program from the Match. 54 This removal
would result in the program not receiving any of the applicants
it has interviewed because those applicants would match to other
hospitals. Finally, and most importantly, violator programs are
referred to ACGME. 55 The status as a violator can presumably
affect the accreditation process, for although ACGME doesn't
require participation in the Match, it strongly encourages participation as part of the accreditation guidelines. 56
Additionally, the NRMP takes a very broad view of the term
"violations." Under the NRMP rules, not only are the programs
and applicants forbidden from signing a contract prior to the
Match,57 but they are also forbidden from enticing each other
into ranking them higher on the rank order list. The programs
and applicants are forbidden from even asking one another
about how they plan to rank each other. 58 Thus, an applicant is
essentially prevented from bargaining with the program for employment conditions prior to the release of the Match results.
In addition to the above mechanisms at its disposal, starting
in 2004, the NRMP has implemented an additional requirement,
school and! or a residency program director if these officials were powerless to take any
action.
521d.
53 Id. § 7.2.2.
54 ld.
551d.
56 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
57 NRMP, Agreement for Applicants & Programs, supra note 38. § 7.1.
58 ld. § 6.0. (UIn addition, although applicants or programs may volunteer how
they plan to rank each other, it is a material breach of this Agreement to request such
information.")
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known as the "all-or-nothing" rule. Previously, in a hospital with
several residency programs (e.g., one in Pediatrics, one in Surgery, etc.), some of the programs could have chosen to participate in the Match, while others, typically smaller programs, may
have chosen to opt OUt. 59 Moreover, a program that intended to
hire more than one resident did not have to offer all of its available slots through the Match. 60 In order to avoid this dual track,
the NRMP has implemented a new rule that requires the entire
institution to either be in or out of the Match. 61 Under this rule,
an individual residency program in a given hospital would no
longer be able to opt out of the Match. This new rule is likely to
increase the number of participating residency programs above
eighty percent, thus even further limiting the choice for students
who may want to opt out of the Match.

III.

Economic Analysis oj the Match
A.

The Anticompetitive Effects

In their complaint, the plaintiffs in Jung claim that the
NRMP system "has the purpose and effect of depressing, standardizing and stabilizing compensation and other terms of employment."62 This part argues that this allegation is indeed
correct because, by the virtue of having students locked into the
one-offer mode, the NRMP prevents hospitals and students from
negotiating terms of employment. In order to understand how
59

However, most programs do participate in the Match because of the ACGME's

"encouragement. "
60 Indeed the program is allowed to change the number ofspot~ available through
the NRMP until end of January. See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, 2004 Main
Match Schedule, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/yearly.html(last visited
May 5, 2004). However, even if the program withdraws slots, it is not allowed to offer
these slots to U.S. medical students who participate in the Match. (The program can
offer them to foreign-trained physicians who participate in the Match.)
61 See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, "'latch Participation Agreement for Institutions § 4.2, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_institution.htrnl
(last visited Aug 16, 2004) ("The institution agrees that all of its programs eligible for
participation in the Matching Program ,,~Il select senior students of U.S. allopathic
medical schools only through the Matching Program, or another national matching
plan. If any position is offered to U.S. allopathic students outside the Matching Program or another national matching plan, including a preliminary position for a program that participates in another national matching plan, the institution and the
program will be in material breach .... ") (Some specialties (e.g., ophthalmology, urology, and otolaryngology) have their own separate matching programs that operate in a
manner identical to the NRMP.)
62 Plaintifft' Class Action Complaint, supra note 3, at 5-6.
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this one-offer system standardizes and depresses wages, one must
first understand how the residency programs are funded.
Hospitals that run accredited medical programs are compensated for training residents. The revenue comes in two distinct streams. 63 One revenue stream is the direct subsidy from
Medicare, whereby the hospital receives a certain amount of dollars per resident per year. 64 Although the formula for determining how much a hospital is entitled to for training a particular
resident is quite complex,6!,) generally speaking, a hospital receives an equal sum for every resident it trains no matter what
specialty that resident pursues. 66 This stream of revenue is
known as Direct Graduate Medical Education ("DGME") Payments. 57 Hospitals also receive what is known as Indirect Medical Education ("IME") payments. 58 These are additional
payments by Medicare for the services that the resident provides
to Medicare beneficiaries. In short, hospitals receive significant
amounts of money for training residents. 69
Although the hospitals do receive significant amounts of
money for training residents, the DGME portion is quite stable,
and is, by and large, the same for all residents. The IME portion
depends on the procedures performed on Medicare patients
and the resident-ta-patient ratio in a given hospital. Hospitals
rely on these payments when determining a resident's salary.
These, however, are not the only funds hospitals receive for
training residents. As with any other service, hospitals bill for,
and receive payments for services rendered by the residents. 70
Further, although the federal government pays a hospital
roughly the same amount of money per resident per year, fed63 CONGo BUDGET OFFICE, Medicare and Graduate Medical Education at ix (Sept.
1995), available at ftp:! /ftp.cbo.gov/Oxx/doc17/Gradmede.pdf (last visited May 7,
2004).
64 ld.
65 Richard M. Knapp, Complexity and Uncertainty in Financing Graduate Medical Education, 77 ACAD. MED. 1076, 1077 (2002).
fifi See id. Note that the amounts are the same across programs within the hospital
but may val)' between different hospitals.
671d.
68 ld. at lO79-80.
69 The IME & DGME payments in FY 2002 totaled almost $9 billion dollars. See id.
70 See HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. ADMIN., GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND
PUBLIC POLICY; A PRIMER 6 (2000) ("Graduate medical education has largely been
funded from patient care income of teaching hospitals . . . ."), available at ftp:!/
ftp.hrsa.gov/bhpr/nationalcenter/GMEprimeLpdf.
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eral law does not require hospitals to divide the money equally
among residents. Thus, hospitals can use money they receive
from the government for one resident to pay the salary of another. Additionally, hospitals can use other streams of revenue
to pay higher salaries to those residents that they deem desirable. Finally, even if we are to assume that hospitals cannot vary
salaries (an assumption that this author explicitly rejects), hospitals may vary employment conditions (e.g., duty hours) betw"een
those residents that it deems more or less desirable. Yet, currently hospitals do none of these things. The reason for such
uniformity is the Match. The Match enables hospitals to set uniform salaries and uniform working conditions by restraining
competition between hospitals for top medical students and between medical students for top hospitals.
In the market for medical schools, or the market for postresidency jobs, an applicant can hold multiple offers. (Indeed
this is true for nearly all school or job markets.) Having several
offers in hand, an applicant can then bargain with employers (or
schools) regarding the salary or other conditions of employment
(or education). Further, when an applicant has one non-binding offer, he can use it as leverage with other potential employers. Thus, an applicant with offers from more prestigious
Employer A and less prestigious Employer B can approach the
latter employer and propose working for him on the condition
that the salary and benefits would exceed that of the former employer. If Employer B is truly interested in hiring this applicant,
he would be enticed into outbidding Employer A in hopes that
the difference in salary, benefits and/or conditions of employment would make up for the lower prestige.
Conversely, in a multiple offer system, a less desirable applicant would be able to approach the more prestigious Employer
A and suggest that he is willing to take a pay cut if the employer
would hire him. Alternatively, an employer who may be looking
to save money can propose to hire a less prestigious applicant on
the condition that he would take less money or work more
hours.
The Match forecloses both possibilities. Under the Match
system, a student cannot receive multiple offers. Consequently,
an applicant cannot use one offer as leverage to obtain either a
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more prestigious position or to bargain for better terms of employment with an equally or less prestigious hospital. The fact
that during the application and interview process applicants can
compare different employment contracts and rank programs accordingly does not mitigate the problem. An applicant can most
certainly rank programs based on salary, prestige, or both. However, a given applicant does not know how many programs are
actually willing to extend an offer to him, therefore, he is in no
position to leverage his marketability. Further, because the
Match rules forbid applicants and programs from making
promises in an attempt to affect how both parties rank each
other, any negotiations that could theoretically occur between a
program and an applicant would either violate the Match agreement (with the concomitant consequences) or would be completely irrelevant, as there would be no way to assure that the
negotiations would in the end bear any fruit.
An additional problem occurs with a single binding offer
system, such as the Match. The Match's single offer mechanism
also prevents a student from receiving offers in multiple specialties. Currently, a hospital pays its residents the same rate, regardless of their specialty.71 Thus, for example, a second-year
Internal Medicine resident at the New York Presbyterian Hospital earns the same amount as a second year Neurosurgery resident or a second-year Radiology resident, despite the fact that
the potential future earnings of each specialty differ. 72 A stu71 Compare compensation for second year resident in Neurosurgery in New York
Presbyterian Hospital (Cornell Campus) Program ($47,487) (http://www.ama-assn.
org/vapp/freida/pgm/0,1238,1603521052,00.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004», with
compensation for second year resident in Internal Medicine at the same hospital
($45,661) (http://www.ama-assn.org/vapp/freida/pgm/O, 1238, 1403521270,00.html
(last visited Sept. 13,2004». (The reason second-year residents are compared is the
fact that Neurosurgery requires a preliminary year of post-graduate training. Thus, a
first-year neurosurgery resident is actually in his second year of training). The salary is
identical despite the fact that Internal Medicine is only a three-year program while Neurosurgery is a six-year program, despite the fact that a Neurosurgery residency is significantly more difficult to obtain, and despite the fact that once they complete the
residency and enter private practice, Neurosurgeons ,,~11 likely earn significantly more
than Family Practitioners. To compare competitiveness of various specialties, see NRMP,
Data Tables, supra note 14 at Table 5 (specif)~ng that out of 4,751 Internal Medicine
positions only 2,602 were filled by U.S. medical graduates and 124 positions remained
unfilled, while for Neurosurgery out of 144 positions 119 were filled by U.S. medical
students with only two remaining unfilled).
72 For comparisons of average earnings in various medical specialties see Physicians Search, First Year Starting Salary -National Average, available at http://www.physi
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dent who can hold offers from both specialties can bargain with
the Internal Medicine program for a higher salary and, should
he get it, he would be free to evaluate whether or not a higher
salary during residency years is worth the lower future salary. A
student who cannot hold multiple offers is prevented from engaging in such bargaining and evaluation of future earnings.
This situation thus allows a given hospital to pay all residents the
same regardless of the competitiveness of the program or the
differences in the future earnings in the respective specialties.
The NRMP rules thus prevent highly marketable students
from obtaining the true value of their services. The rules also
prevent less marketable students from attempting to secure a position by underbidding their competitors. Futher, applicants
cannot compare offers from various specialties to make a decision whether to enroll in a more competitive specialty with a
lower salary but higher potential lifetime earnings, or in a less
competitive specialty with a higher salary but lower lifetime
earnings.
Proponents of the Match argue that the Match does not affect salaries 73 and point to an article by Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth 74 to bolster their claim. The Niederle and Roth article
investigated the salaries of gastroenterology ("CI") fellows when
the Match existed for this subspecialty75 and when the Match was
abandoned. The article also compared the salaries of other Internal Medicine subspecialties, some of which do, and some of
which do not, utilize the Match. The article concludes that the
salary remained the same, both in the presence and absence of
cianssearch.com/physician/salaryl.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004), and Physicians
Search, Physician Compensation Suroey -In Practice Three Plus Years, available at http://www.
physicianssearch.com/physician/salary2.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). Note that the
average starting salary of a neurosurgeon is almost 50% higher than that of an internist
($185,000 versus $128,000). The average salary of a neurosurgeon that has been practicing for over three years is almost 300% higher than that of an internist in practice for
over three years ($438,000 versus $160,000). Yet, while one is a resident the salary is
identical for neurosurgeons and internists.
73 Save the Match: FAQ, at http://www.savethematch.org!faq/all.aspx#q320872605
(last visited Sept. 13, 2004). ("The Match has no involvement whatsoever in setting
resident stipends .... ")
74 Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, What Are The Effects of a Match? Evidence from
Internal Medicine, available at hup:! !www.stanford.edu!-niederle!Effects.of.a.Match.pdf
(last visited May 9, 2004).
75 GI fellowships are not residency programs, rather they are post-residency subspecialization programs. See infra note 89.
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the Match. 76 The study, however, is flawed. Fellows' salaries are
often based on residents' salaries (hospitals consider fellowships
as additional post-graduate training and compensate accordingly).77 The subspecialty investigated by Niederle and Roth is
relatively small and narrow,78 and the salaries within that subspecialty are essentially tied to the salaries paid to the residents
(which in turn are affected by the Match). Because of the above
two facts the presence or absence of the Match within an isolated
subspecialty is unlikely to have any effect on the salaries within
that subspecialty, so long as the Match pervades the remainder
of the process.
Further, the Match involves significant transactional costs. 79
Because hospitals cannot quickly choose their most desired students, they are forced to interview more people than they would
in the absence of the Match. 80 The hospitals interview more
people because they are not sure who would actually match into
their programs. 81 The applicants also suffer transactional costs.
The increase in the number of interviews conducted by hospitals
increases the costs (e.g., travel, lodging) for applicants. 82 The
late appointment date creates feelings of stress and uncertainty
and also precludes applicants from making timely arrangements
for life beyond medical schoo1. 83 This of course also impacts applicants' spouses and families who too must wait and speculate
about their future. 84
Niederle & Roth, supra note 74.
See, e.g., FREIDA Online Program Information SUNY at Stony Brook Program (specifying that the first year of a GI fellowship (available after three years of Internal Medicine
training) is treated as "Graduate Year 4"), available at http://www.ama-a~sn.org/vapp/
freida/pgm/0,1238,1443521012,00.html (last visited May 9,2004). Note that the salary
for a first year GI fellow (i.e., a person in "Graduate Year 4") is exactly the same as a
salary fur a fourth year Surgery resident (available at http://www.ama-assn.org/vapp/
freida/pgm/0,1238,4403521242,00.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2004», despite the fact
that the former has completed a full residency training and now undergoing sub-specialization, while the latter is barely half-way through his primary specialty residency
training.
78 There are only 357 GI fellows per year nationwide. Niederle & Roth, supra note
74 at 5. Indeed there are only 3,288 fellowship positions within internal medicine. Id.
In contrast, there are 21,192 first-year residency positions. See Roth, supra note 12.
79 Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk Selection
Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 CEO. L. J. 1749, 1766 (1995).
80 Id. at 1767.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1767-68.
83 Id. at 1772.
84 Clark, supra note 79, at 1772.
76
77
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The PTOcompetitive justifications and their Refutation

The proponents of the Match argue that the current system
has several pro-competitive qualities. In passing the Pension
Funding Equity Act of 2004,85 Congress agreed with the Match's
proponents and found the Match to be a "highly efficient, procompetitive" process. 86 This section examines the arguments advanced by the Match's proponents and accepted by Congress,
and concludes that these arguments are not convincing.
The NRMP claims that the Match is procompetitive because
it allows students to (1) "[c]ompletely and thoroughly evaluate
each program they are considering without the pressure of early
'exploding offers;'" (2) "[d]elay making their final decisions until after they've had more clinical experience on which to base
their choices;" and (3) "[c]ompete based on merit rather than
influence."87 We will look at these arguments in turn.
The Match process does indeed ensure that students are not
faced with "exploding offers." It is, however, questionable
whether the prevention of exploding offers is indeed procompetitive.
First, it is altogether unclear to this author whether the exploding offer is a real or is merely a strawman argument. For
example, neither colleges nor medical schools employ exploding offers when recruiting students. 88 It is unclear why residency
programs would utilize such a tactic. Further, this author has
Pension Funding Equity Act, supra note 6.
Id. ~ 207(a)(1) (E).
87 Save the Match FAQ at http://www.savethemalch.org/faq/all.aspx (last visited
Mar. 10, 2004). The NRMP advances two additional reasons, namely that the Match
allows students to "[rJank programs in accordancc with the students' true preferences,
without having to worry about whether a program's interest in them is genuine or not
or prejudicing their ability to secure a position at one of their 'safe' choices;" and to
"[t]ry to get into the best programs in the specialty they wish to practice, without prejudicing their ability to secure a position at one of their 'safe' choices." The last argumen t is essentially a repetition of the very first one advanced. The second to last
argument is a non sequitur. The ability to rank programs is neither pro- nor anticompetitive. To the extent that this argument advances the position that the Match allows
students to explore more preferred options without fear that the "safe" choices would
fill-up with other applicants \~a the use of exploding offers, this argument is dealt with
when addressing NRMP's first claim of procompetitive effects.
88 See, e.g., AM. Assoc. OF MED. COLLEGES, Recommendations Concerning Medical
School Acceptance Procedures for First-Year Entering Students, available at http://www.aamc.
org/students/applying/policies/admissionofficers.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2004).
("Prior to May 15 of the year of matriculation, an applicant should be given at least two
weeks to reply to an offer of admission") (emphasis added).
85

86
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not been able to find any evidence of exploding offers in medical fellowships.so If the exploding offer is truly a problem, one
would expect it to occur in fellowships that do not participate in
the Match. Yet, this problem does not arise. This leads one to
conclude that even with the elimination of the Match, exploding
offers will not become a serious problem.
Second, even assuming that exploding offers will make their
return in the absence of the Match, it is debatable whether
NRMP's way of eliminating this eventuality is procompetitive.
The problem with this is that Match benefits are not evenly distributed between hospitals and students. The hospitals who seek
the most qualified applicants benefit from the Match because
they are assured that these applicants would not be seized
early.90 The second-tier hospitals, on the other hand, lose because, in the absence of the Match, they could have obtained
more desirable residents by enticing them to commit early.91 It
is questionable whether applicants actually enjoy any benefit at
all in this system. Although the most sought after applicants
gain in the Match system because they have an opportunity to
weigh different options and make their true choice, they lose
because they cannot parlay their marketability into either an
early secure offer (thus decreasing their stress) or multiple offers
that can be used as leverage. On the one hand, the less desirable
applicants benefit because the most desirable slots are not
quickly taken by the best applicants. On the other hand, these
applicants lose because they cannot compensate for their relative lack of marketability by making an early commitment to the
hospital and thus saving that hospital money on the additional
search.
89 Fellowships are programs where a physician who has completed training can
obtain additional training in a subspecialty. For example, after completing a Radiology
residency, a physician may choose to pursue a Pediatric radiology fellowship. Fellowships are run similar to residency programs, and fellows' compensation is significantly
lower than that of practicing physicians. Although some fellowships participate in the
Fellowship Match, most do not. The NRMP currently provides matching services to
only 35 fellowship subspecialties. For a list of fellowship subspecialties participating in
the NRMP see http://www.nrmp.org/fellow/index.html (last visited May 7, 2004).
90 See Clark, supra note 79, at 1772-73 (arguing that a matching system similar to
the NRMP if implemented for the federal judiciary would primarily benefit the judges
interested only in the top-notch applicants). The same logic applies to the Match in the
context of selecting a residency.
91 Srr id.
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The second argument put forth by the defenders of the
Match is that the program prevents the creep in the timeline
that was experienced before the Match. This argument is flawed
because the Match was not the mechanism that solved the forward creep in the appointment dates. That problem was solved
when medical schools agreed to embargo academic records until
the beginning of the fourth year. 92 As described in Part II, ante,
this agreement resulted in medical students being selected for
residency at the most appropriate time in the cycle, i.e., during
the fourth year of studies.
Moreover, today's medical students' search for residency
differs from the search of the students of the 1940s in one important aspect. Today, many residency programs require that
students submit the results of the first in a series of licensing
exams, the United States Medical Licensing Exam, the USMLE,
Step I, with their application. 93 This exam was not administered
in the 1940s. 94 The majority of today's students take the exam
between their second and third year,95 as the exam tests the subjects taught during the first two years. 96 Because the score on
the exam often determines competitiveness for a residency slot97
and because the exam cannot be retaken once passed,98 students
See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
See UNIV. OF 1LL.-CHICAGO, COLL. OF MED., OFFICE OF STUDENT AFFAIRS CAREER
PLAN. RESOURCES, Residency Application Process, available at http://www.uic.edu/depts/
mcam/osa/careers/residency/ResComponents2005.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004)
("Step I scores are an important tool used by many programs to screen applicants for
residency internews and provide a basis for comparison. The more competitive the
program, the higher the Step I score required.").
94 The USMLE was introduced in 1994. See Gregory Dolin, Licensing Health Care
Professionals: Has the United States Outlived the Need for Medical Licensure?, 2 GEO. J. L. &
PUB. POL'y 315,319 (2004).
95 See, e.g., UNIV. OF N. C., SCH. OF MED., Policy for Completion of the USMLE Step 1 &
2 Exams, available at http://www.med.unc.edu/curriculum/Administration/usmle.htm
(last visited May 10, 2004). ("Typically, students are expected to take Step I for the first
time in Mayor June following the completion of the second year."); UNIV. OF TEX.SOUTHWESTERN, SCH. OF MED., Catalog, Second Year: Medical School Curriculum, available at
http://www8.utsouthwestern.edu/utsw/ cda/ deptI37886/files/137919.html (last visited May 10, 2004) ("Students will usually take the U.S. Medical Licensing Examination
Step I at the conclusion of the second year.")
96 See U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, STEP 1 Content Outline, available at
http://www.usmle.org/stepl/intro.htm. ("The test is designed to measure basic science knowledge.")
97 See supra note 93.
98 See U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, 2004 Bulletin, Eligibility, available at
http://www.usmle.org/bulletin/2004/eligibility.htm. (last visited May 10, 2004) ("If
you pass a Step, you are not allowed to retake it .... ")
92

93
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are unlikely to attempt to take it before the end of their second
year. The results of the exam are usually available a month
later. 99 Thus, at the very least, residency programs would not
recruit until the Step I results become available, i.e., somewhere
in the middle of the third year, at the earliest.
The next argument advanced by the proponents of the
NRMP suggests that the Match allows students to compete on
merits, rather than on connections. IOO To begin with, it is a
rather dubious proposition. It should be beyond dispute that an
applicant whose family member is, for example, a senior staff
member or a large donor to a given institution is in a better
position than a no-name applicant whether with or without the
Match. It should also be beyond dispute that a program director
is no more likely to deny a favor to his superior, benefactor, or
college buddy in the presence of a Match system than in the
absence thereof. Of course, the rankings are not released,lol but
if the connected applicant did not match in the desired place, it
would become clear quite quickly that the program director refused to rank said applicant high enough. Whatever repercussions such program director would face in an open market
system for refusing to accommodate his superior, benefactor, or
college buddy, are present in the Match system as well. The only
difference is that in the latter system the repercussions are
delayed until the Match Day. Thus, the argument that the
Match eliminates (or even mitigates) the influence peddling in
the residency selection process is wholly without merit.
The Match has few, if any, procompetitive effects. The potential justifications advanced by the NRMP do not withstand
scrutiny. However, even if the claims asserted by the NRMP are
correct, the procompetitive effects are so minor that they do not
justify the existence of the Match. It is to this argument that the
article now turns.
99 U.S. MED. LICENSING EXAMINATION, 2004 Bulletin, Scaring and Score Reporting,
available at http://www.usmle.org/bulletin/2004/scoring.hun. (last visited May 10,
2004) ("Step results typically have been available in time to mail your report within
three to four weeks after your test date".)
100 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
101 See NAT'L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, Frequently Asked Questions about the
NRMP's Interactive Web Site, available at http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/faq/us_seniorsjaq.html (last visited May 10,2004) (specifying that the applicant is "the only one,
other than the NRMP staff, who can access your rank order list").
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The Legal Analysis of the Match

As mentioned previously, Congress has enacted legislation
that essentially provides the NRMP a blanket exemption from
antitrust liability. The legislation does not even permit the fact
that a residency program participates in the Match to be used as
evidence in court. 102 Thus, it is likely that the law as it currendy
stands would allow the NRMP to escape liability.103 However, because this author believes that the predicate for congressional
action is incorrect (i. e., that the Match is a "highly efficient, procompetitive ... process"), 104 it is worth analyzing how the NRMP
would have fared under the traditional antitrust jurisprudence.
This part explores the legal landscape facing the NRMP as it
stood before the enactment of the Pension Funding Equity Act
of 2004.105
The legal framework under which the Match is to be analyzed is not crystal clear because, as explained above, the Match
does not directly set prices. However, as argued in Part lILA, ante,
the Match does empower participants to set prices. The courts
have found certain behavior anti-competitive even if it does not
directly affect prices. 106
For example, in Professional Engineers,107 the Supreme Court
required the association of engineers to affirmatively defend an
ethics rule prohibiting members from discussing fees with prospective customers prior to being selected for a project because
the agreement "impede[d] the ordinary give and take of the
market place."108 Similarly, in Indiana Dentists,J09 the Court
ruled that the withholding of X-rays from patients' insurers was
"likely enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the pricesetting mechanism of the market that it may be condemned
even absent proof that it resulted in higher prices or ... the
102 Pension Funding Equity Act, supra note 6, § 207(b) (2). ("Evidence of [participating in any matching program] shall not be admissible in Federal court to support
any claim or action alleging a violation of the antitmst laws.")
103 The District Court has already so mled. See supra note 2.
104

Pension Funding Equity Act, supra note 6.
See, e.g., FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986); Nat'l Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
107 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
108 [d. at 692.
109 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
105

106
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purchase of higher priced services, than would occur in its absence."IIO The key question, therefore, is not whether the Match
mechanism actually sets prices, but whether the Match "disrupt[s] the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism
of the market. "111
First and foremost, under traditional antitrust jurisprudence, the court must determine whether the arrangement affects commerce. In the present case, the defendants have
argued that residency training is not commerce and that residents are not employees. 1l2 Instead, the defendants contend
that residency training is education and residents are students
who learn "hands-on."1l3 This argument should be quickly rejected by the courts. Hospitals and residents exchange money
for services. Hospitals pay residents a salary (or provide them
with a stipend, to use NRMP's terminol ogy1l4) in exchange for
the services residents perform in treating patients. In addition
to receiving monetary compensation, the residents also receive
an educational benefit, the mere receipt of which cannot possibly remove the resident-hospital relationship outside the scope
of commercial activity. As far back as 1975, the Supreme Court
has emphatically stated that "the exchange of [] a service for
money is 'commerce' in the most common usage of that
word."115 Even if one agrees with the defendants' view that residency training is education and education only, one still would
have to conclude that the activity is commercial. In U.S. v. Brown
University,116 the Third Circuit held that educational institutions
such as universities engage in commerce, and thus fall under the
antitrust laws, when they "sell" their education to the students,u7
110 ld. at 461·62.
ld.
Jung v. AAMC, Motion of Defendant ACGME to Dismiss at 2. The motion was
joined by four hospital defendants. See opinion on Motions to Dismiss at 84, n.35 (Feb. 11,
2004).
113 See,
e.g., Jordan J. Cohen, An Unqualified Victory, available at http://
www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/sept04/word.htm (last visited Oct. 9, 2004).
("[O]ur residents are primarily learners, not employees")
114 See generally Save the Match FAQ, available at http://savethemath.org/faq/
all.aspx (last visited Oct. 9, 2004). Note that throughout the website the word "salary" is
not used. Instead, compensation is referred to as a "stipend."
115 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1975).
116 Broom Univ. 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993).
117 ld. at 666. (" [T]he payment of tuition in return for educational services constitutes commerce.")
111

112
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The teaching hospitals certainly engage in commerce at least to
the extent the universities do.
Having resolved the preliminary question of the applicability of antitrust laws, the next part of the examination is what
standards the court is to utilize in adjudicating the case against
the NRMP. The Match is an arrangement made by and for professionals, ostensibly for the benefit of the profession. The Supreme Court has said on several occasions that judgments of the
professionals with respect to their profession merit a more differential review than most other contracts or combinations. 1 IS
Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the courts will conduct anything less than a full review that would balance anticompetitive
and procompetitive effects. 1l9 Utilizing the "rule of reason" balancing test approach, the court will have to determine whether
the benefits that the Match provides justifY its existence. 120
118 See, e.g., Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 475 U.S. at 458-59; Professional Eng'rs, 435 U.S.
at 696; Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788-789, n.17.
119 See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 670. ("The [Supreme] Court in
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 44 L.Ed.2d 572 (1975), counseled against applying traditional antitrust rules outside of conventional business
contexts.")
120 The "rule of reason" comes from the 1911 Supreme Court case Standard Oil Co.
v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Although the Sherman Act states that every agreement in restraint of trade is unlawful, in certain situations that would lead to absurd
results (e.g., attorneys forming a partnerships and agreeing not to compete against
themselves would technically be an agreement in restraint of trade and therefore not
permitted under the literal reading of the Sherman Act). In Standard Oil, however, the
Supreme Court clarified that only those agreements that are unreasonable will be held to
be illegal. Thus, agreements in restraint of trade could be defended if some reasonable
purpose ,,-as offered. Nonetheless, some agreements (e.g., outright price-fixing) have
been held to be so inherently unreasonable that no explanation would be sufficient to
justify them. See United States v. Topco Assocs.,405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972) ("v"hile the
Court has utilized the 'rule of reason' in evaluating the legality of most restraints alleged to be violative of the Sherman Act, it has also developed the doctrine that certain
business relationships are per se violations of the Act without regard to a consideration
of their reasonableness .... It is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act.")
Because of their unique status, professions have been treated more deferentially by
the Supreme Court. Agreements within professions arc almost always subject to the
"rule of reason," as opposed to "per se" analysis because the Court allows for the possibility that the obligations of the profession to those they serve may mandate arrangements inappropriate to other business ventures. See, e.g., Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 788 n.17
("The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sherman Act. . . . The public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may
require t1lat a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the
Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently.") Thus, the Match, as an arrangement by the medical profession could (under the traditional antitrust analysis)
only be deemed illegal if it is proven that the it is an unreasonable restraint of trade.
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Although this article suggests that there are indeed no benefits to the Match and the benefits claimed by its proponents are
illusory, for the purposes of the discussion below, the author assumes that the benefits as put forth by the NRMP do exist.
Courts have consistently held that social welfare concerns
cannot justify restraints on competition. 121 This legal rule
should eliminate NRMP's third and fourth justification. 122 The
epitome of the social benefit justification is competition based
on merit and the ability to rank programs according to true preferences. These justifications, therefore, cannot serve as a counterweight to the costs that the Match imposes on the applicants.
We are thus left with the justifications that the Match allows students to (1) "[c]ompletely and thoroughly evaluate each program they are considering without the pressure of early
'exploding offers;'" and (2) "[d]elay making their final decisions
until after they've had more clinical experience on which to base
their choices."123 These justifications are arguably economic because they promote more informed consumer choice.
In evaluating whether the reasons advanced by the proponent of a restraint on trade are sufficient to justify the restraint,
the court must decide "whether the challenged agreement is
necessary to achieve its purported goals."124 Using this test, it
should be quite clear, given the discussion ante, that the Match is
completely unnecessary to achieve the NRMP's second goal (i.e.,
allowing the students to "[d]elay making their final decisions until after they've had more clinical experience"125). An agreement to withhold students' data prior to a certain date during or
at the end of the third year is sufficient to meet this goal. 126 This
embargo would be easier to maintain than in the past because of
For a comprehensive discussion on the rule of reason see Phillip Areeda, The Rule
of Reason-A Catechism on Competition, PiS ANTITRUST LJ. 571 (1986).
121 See Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 669 citing Proj'IEng'rs, 435 U.S. at 695; Ind. Dentists, 476
U.S. at 463 ("A restraim on competition cannot be justified solely on the basis of social
welfare concerns.")
122 As indicated previously, NRMP's fifth contention is that with the Match students
can "[t]ry to get into the best programs in the specialty they wish to practice, without
prejudicing their ability to secure a position at one of their 'safe' choices." This argumem is merely a repetition of the first one and does not warrant a separate discussion.
See supra note 87.
123 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
124 Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 678.
125 See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
I ~6 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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the presence of an additional backslide stopper, the USMLE
Step I.127
Nor does the NRMP's first concern justify the existence of
the Match. To battle that problem, an agreement to keep the
offers open for a given period, similar to the one employed by
the National Association for Law Placement, should be sufficient. 128 The expected counter-argument would be that such a
system would fail just like it did in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
That argument should be rejected because the residency market
in the 1940s is simply not analogous to the residency market today. For example, in the 1940s, residency was optional and today it is required. 129 Thus, hospitals should be less likely to
attempt to lock-in students because, unlike the 1940s, students
may not choose to forgo post-graduate training. In any event,
given the fact that exploding offers have not created a problem
in the market for physicians post-residency (whether seeking a
fellowship or entering the market as a practitioner), nor in the
market for students seeking to enter medical schools even in the
absence of a comparable matching mechanism,130 it should
stand to reason that the Match is wholly unnecessary to protect
medical students from the problem of exploding offers. Moreover, even if the Match is necessary to prevent exploding offers,
the benefit obtained does not outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the system.
After examining the necessity of the Match to achieve the
purported pro-competitive benefits, the courts should conclude
that the Match is too broad a restraint to justify the advantages it
See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.
See NAT'L Assoc. OF L. PLACEMENT, Principles and Standards § IV.F.1, available at
http://www.nalp.org/pands/pands.htm (last visited May 10, 2004) ("Employers should
give candidates a reasonable period of time to consider offers of employment and
should avoid conduct that subjects candidates La undue pressure to accept."). NALP
guidelines pro~ide specific regulations for specific situations and specify how long the
offers should be kept open, and conversely specify how many offers an applicant is
allowed to hold at a given time. See id. § V.
129 See, e.g., N. C. Mm. Bo., A Brief History of the North Carolina Medical Board: 18592000 available at http://www.ncmedboard.org/brdhst.htm (last visited May 5, 2004).
("Prior to 1977, applicants for a license were not required to have post-graduate medical education or training. With an amendment to the Medical Practice Act at that time,
applicants for a full license were required to have at least one year of post-graduate
training. Then, in 1985, the law was modified to require three years of post-graduate
training for foreign medical graduates.")
130 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
127

128
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brings.I~1 Alternatively, the benefits of the Match do not outweigh the costs that the system imposes.

V.

The Alternative Solutions

If the current Match mechanism for securing a residency
position is to disappear, an alternative system is needed to take
its place. The alternatives can be broadly described as falling
into three categories: (1) a voluntary matching system, (2) a
binding multiple matching system, and (3) the free market system. The first system operates much like today's Match, but
both students and programs are able to withdraw at any time and
there is no obligation to honor the match if it occurs. The second system also operates similar to the present-day Match, except that a student can be matched into multiple locations and
then can choose and bargain with the programs. The third option is self-explanatory. This part will discuss each option in
turn.

A.

A Voluntary Match

One of the solutions proposed by the plaintiffs in Jung is to
make the Match voluntary.132 A voluntary approach would keep
most of the features of the Match in place, but would allow students to opt out of the program at any point. 133 The same optout option would exist for the residency programs. I34 This solution potentially solves the main problem with the Match, for it
would allow students to receive multiple offers and to evaluate
them. Although this solution may well pass the antitrust scrutiny, it is unsatisfactory.
Whether the Match is mandatory or voluntary, the transaction costs associated with running the program remain. I3s Hos131 This author remains convinced that the Match indeed brings no benefits. To
the extent however. that some advantages flow from the arrangement, these advantages
are insufficient to justify the restraint.
132 SeeJung v. AAMC, Plaintiffs First Supplemental Answer to Defendants' Common Interrogatory Relating to Class Certification at 2, available at http://residentcase.com/03_so1utions_alternatives/pdf/rnterrogatory_Answer.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004); see also,
The "Voluntary Match, » Proposed Improvemmt to the Currmt National Residency Matching Program, available at http://residentcase.com/03_solutions_alternatives/pdf/The_Voluntary_Match.pdf (last visited May 10, 2004) [hereinafter The Voluntary Match].
133 See 171e Voluntary Match, supra note 132, at 3.
134 [d. at 2.
13!; See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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pitals, if they remain committed to this new mechanism, would
still interview more students than necessary136 and students
would again have to in many cases put the planning of their future life on hold. 137
The most fundamental problem with a voluntary Match,
however, is that it may not be feasible. Because of certain transactional costs associated with running the Match, it may become
too costly to run a program in which very few participants are
bound. The long-term survival of any voluntary matching
scheme is doubtful because of the rather high costs and rather
uncertain result. 138 For these reasons, a voluntary Match is not
the appropriate solution.

B.

A Binding Multiple Match

Yet another solution was proposed by Ms. Melinda Creasman. 139 Ms. Creasman argues for a system indistinguishable
from the one the NRMP is currently running, except for the fact
that on the Match Day, a student would match to two hospitals. 140 Unfortunately, this proposal only barely addresses the
problems with the current Match while keeping the transactional costs. Further, the proposal may be completely
unworkable.
First, the multiple binding match system still limits the applicants to a given number of matches. 141 This in turn limits
their ability to truly weigh all possible options. While there is
little dispute that a choice between two programs is better than
no choice at all, no arrangement should arbitrarily limit the
choices of graduating medical students in the U.S ..
Additionally, any systematic Match system (single or multi1~6
137
138

See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompan)~ng text.
See Clark, supra note 78, at 1764 (arguing that "a matching system is bound to
disintegrate unless virtually all programs with positions to offer participate"). Oark provides several examples of matching programs that failed because of lack of participation. See also Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, jumping the Gun: Imperfections and Institutions
Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 992 (1994) (describing
how matching systems that lack commitment unravel).
1~9 See Creasman, supra note 33.
140 Jd. at 1473-75.
141 Ms. Creasman proposes a maximum of two matches. This of course prevents
the applicant who could have gotten three or more offers from truly exercising his own
marketability.
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pie) retains the rather high transaction costs. 142 Indeed, the
transaction costs may be increased because hospitals would need
to interview twice as many candidates as they interview under the
current system, with no particular assurance that their efforts will
result in the desired candidates accepting their offer.
In a multiple match system, the legal analysis and the balancing of interests remain the same as in the current system. If
it is accepted that the current Match provides no benefits, or
that the benefits it provides do not justifY the restraints, one
must conclude the same with respect to the multiple match
system.
Finally, a multiple match system may prove to be completely
unworkable. As previously stated, any program that enrolls residents must be accredited by the ACGME.143 One of the major
criteria for ACGME accreditation is "the adequacy of resources
for resident education such as quality and volume of patients
and related clinical material available for education, faculty-resident ratio, institutional funding, and the quality of faculty teaching."144 Accordingly, a program is accredited to train only a
certain number of residents. 145 Under the ACGME rules, a residency program cannot hire residents in excess of its accredited
capacity.146 A multiple match system may result in an over-enrollment of residents in some programs and an under-enrollment in others. In a multiple match system, a student may
receive two (or any other number larger than one) offers. Presumably, then a given hospital must extend twice as many offers,
given that any student offered a position can enroll in the second program. However, if the Match results are binding, there
is nothing to prevent all individuals to whom the hospital has
extended the offer from taking it. Thus, a hospital may end up
with up to twice (or thrice, depending on the number of multiple matches) residents as it can enroll under the ACGME guidelines. Another hospital may end up with no residents at all. This
See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
144 ACGME. Common Program Requirements § II.B, available at http://\\ww.acgme.
org/DutyHours/ dUlyHoursCommonPR.asp (last visited May 10, 2004).
145 ld. ("A[] R[esidency] R[eview] C[ommiuee] may approve the number of residents based upon established wriuen criteria.").
146 See id.
142
143
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problem may be able to be solved by hospitals ranking a number
of students not to exceed its allotted slots. The hospital would
then wait for the Match results and acceptances, and fill
whatever slots remain through either the Scramble or a secondround Match. This procedure seems to be quite cumbersome
and unwarranted given the rather minimal improvement it
would have over the status quo.
C.

A Free Market System

A free market system of applying for and obtaining residency positions solves the problems discussed ante. In this system, a student can receive any number of offers and can use
them to negotiate the best contract possible. A student can also
attempt to obtain a coveted position by underbidding other students. Should the hospital be more interested in saving money
than in recruiting the most prestigious students, it may well
choose to hire an individual who is willing to work at a lower
compensation rate. Thus, both the hospitals and the students
would be able to engage in the ordinary give and take of the
market place. 147
Two problems exist with a completely open free market system. The first problem is the forward creep of the appointment
date. The second problem is the dilemma of exploding offers.
Both of these problems can be resolved by agreements that
would limit the dates of entry into the market place and promulgate rules for open offers.
In order to prevent the forward creep of the appointment
date, all that is needed is an agreement similar to the one
reached by medical schools in 1945 148 or an agreement similar
to the one currently utilized in the federal judicial law clerk selection process. 149 This should resolve any concerns about the
forward creep of the appointment date and would allow students
to fully sample various specialties during their third year prior to
making a decision about their career.
Prof!. Eng'rs., 435 U.S. at 692.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
149 See Summary of Law Clerk Hiring Plan for 2004, available at http://www.cadc.uscourts. gOY/bin/Lawclerk/Lawckerkpdf/ Summary_oCthe_PlanJor_2004. pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) (specifying that the process is not to begin earlier than a certain
date).
147
148
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The problem of exploding offers mayor may not be a real
problem. This article has already discussed that exploding offers
do not plague medical school or fellowship admission
processes. 150 There is no particular reason, therefore, to believe
that exploding offers would return to the residency selection
process. Further, the very premise that the search for residency
employment should operate under different terms than the
search for any other employment is questionable.
If, however, one believes that exploding offers are problematic and should be eliminated, a rule could be promulgated
(perhaps as a part of ACGME accreditation standards, to make
it enforceable) requiring hospitals to keep any extended offer
open for some reasonable period of time, for example five days.
Such a rule would allay any concerns regarding exploding offers.
The only remaining question is whether the above proposed
rules would pass judicial muster. 151 After all, these rules also restrict trade insofar as they do not allow the market participants
to engage in negotiations at such time as they deem fit and to
make such offers as they seem appropriate. However, it is likely
that these rules would indeed survive antitrust scrutiny. As the
Supreme Court has stated" [t] he true test of legality is whether
the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps
thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."152 Because the embargo
rule is likely to promote economic efficiency by providing students with additional information before they make their
choices regarding specialty, it is likely to be upheld. The same is
true with respect to the open offer rule. The rule would promote competition by allowing students to entertain multiple
offers.
Thus, a free market scheme limited only by the rules regulating the timing of recruiting and the continuous availability of
offers made would provide the best system for students and hospitals to negotiate conditions of employment while avoiding the
pitfalls of the pre-Match era.
150

See supra, Part UtA.

[n light of the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004, any set of matching or nonmatching rules would likely pass judicial muster. This question, however, is whether
under traditional antitrust theory the proposed rules would survive.
152 Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
151
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Conclusion

The Match system run by the NRMP started out as an attempt to bring order to medical students' frustrating experience
of attempting to secure residency positions. Over the years, however, the Match has become so restrictive as to limit students'
choice and ability to obtain the best deal for the hard work they
provide. Congress erred when it declared the Match to be procompetitive and efficient and should reconsider its conclusion
on these issues.
The time has come to abandon the Match and to allow students to engage in true negotiations with the potential employers. Any attempt to resuscitate the Match by restructuring it will
only mask the problem without providing any real benefits. The
time has come to let the Match die and not attempt any heroic
measures to save it. The time has come to recognize that the
market for medical residencies should be treated like any other
employment market.

